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Expanding income disparities and social inequalityamong different classes, groups and regions have beenemerging as prominent issues in contemporary China.
The gaps began to widen when China embarked on the path
of reform and opening to the outside world three decades ago.
Over these decades, China’s economy has been registering
some of the fastest growth rates in the world but one crucial
question has surfaced above the din: How can China deal
with the chasms in respect of income and social standing? Ed-
ucation is regarded by many people as an effective tool for
evening out differences. However, that raises the question as
to who has access to education. Whether education makes a
dent on income differences and social inequality or not de-
pends on the distribution of educational resources. A more
equal distribution of resources can be expected to lead to a de-
crease in income disparities and social inequality. But what
has been the experience since the adoption of reform and
open-door policies in the late 1970s in China and what influ-
ence has it had on economic and social inequalities? This is
a crucial question that will be examined here.Social  Strati f ication
Many scholars have looked into the relationship between
education and social development in China. Education is a
comprehensive entity that is approached by various strands
of social sciences. This paper takes a sociological look at
education in China. One model propounded by the Amer-
ican sociologists, Peter M. Blau and Otis Dudley Duncan,
attached importance to the influence of education on the at-
tainment of social position.((1) Their theory has had great
impact on research into the relationship between education
and social stratification in China. Other scholars have
noted that before the 1980s, and more specifically, during
the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), “the advantage of com-
ing from an educated family or an intelligentsia or cadre
family was drastically reduced” and the “weak association
between father’s socio-economic status and son’s educa-
tional attainment” reflected “massive state intervention.”((2)
But the distribution became more and more unequal after
1980, and especially after 1990.((3) And the increase in ed-
ucational opportunities since the mid-1990s has not trans-
lated into a more equal distribution of educational re-
sources: Rather the opposite has occurred.((4)
Much emphasis has been placed on the impact of family
background, gender, ethnicity and other factors on educa-
tional attainment, but there has been insufficient research
on the influence of group interests on educational inequal-
ity in China. While family background is closely related to
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At a time of growing economic and social inequality in China, there is a tendency to invoke education as a great leveller
but that rose-tinted view fails to take cognisance of the role of entrenched vested interests which are in fact nurturing
educational disparities precisely because education helps to perpetuate them. Current arrangements in education in








group interests, there has been little examination of which
groups decision-makers belong to and what motivates their
policies with regard to education. Of course, not every pol-
icy pertaining to public services can be attributed to group
interests and certainly checks and balances play their part.
But such checks operate less than efficiently in China.
In the past three decades, the development of education has
been determined by the elite groups, i.e. those who are rich
or powerful or who hold professional positions in China.
The question is whether educational development controlled
by these elites can be expected to decrease the inequalities
between groups or classes. This article analyses the changes
in policy in the field of education and the roles and activi-
ties of different groups that have influenced these changes
over the past thirty years.Pol ici es  and Thei r  Impact
The distribution of educational resources in China is deter-
mined largely by the central government’s policies. Over the
past three decades, there have been important changes in
policy, the biggest among them being that since the early
1980s, governments at different levels have had widely vary-
ing responsibilities for education development. This has led
to a skewing of educational development between rural and
urban areas. The different levels of governments are respon-
sible for the development of education within their adminis-
trative jurisdictions. Among their responsibilities, raising fi-
nancial resources is the most crucial and others are less im-
portant. Local governments are expected to be the main fi-
nancial supporters of education in their areas. This effec-
tively means that at lower levels of administration, there is
much less financial backing than in the upper levels. For in-
stance, a survey conducted in 2001 by the Development Re-
search Centre of the State Council (Guowuyuan fazhan
yanjiu zhongxin), a think-tank of the Chinese cabinet,
showed that of the total financial support for rural education,
13% came from the central government, provincial govern-
ments and municipalities, 9% from county-level authorities
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and 78% from rural administrations.((5) Meanwhile, rural
governments have the least share of total revenue, while gov-
ernments at higher levels in China hog the bigger slices of
the cake. As a result, most rural governments have little
money while retaining the greater part of the obligations. In
2005, the central government took 52.3% of total revenue,
whereas its share in total expenditure on education was a
mere 5.66%. In fact, the central authorities spent even less
before 2003, but have since then sought to invest more in
order to write off fees paid by peasants at primary school
and middle school levels.((6)
There are big differences in the development of education
not only between rural and urban areas but also different re-
gions, cities of different administrative ranking and different
schools within the same jurisdiction. 
The central government has put much effort into fostering
higher education, especially the development of prestigious
universities and colleges and has attached much less impor-
tance to primary and secondary education. At the level of
provinces too, the emphasis has been on nurturing provincial
universities, colleges and the most important middle schools.
A similar attitude prevails among municipal and county gov-
ernments. This leaves hardly any resources for schools at the
township and village level. Many rural governments have no
money to operate schools or to pay teachers’ salaries in time.
Peasants are forced to pay for the development of rural ed-
ucation. It is one of their biggest burdens. No wonder edu-
cation in rural areas lags far behind that in the cities. To sum
up, governments at higher levels have more funds for educa-
tion within their administrative districts and residents of ad-
vanced regions enjoy more educational resources than those
in underdeveloped ones. If that were all, it would be bad
enough. But what is worse, some other policies make it even
harder for the indigent to cope, as will be seen presently.Crippling  the  Poor
In the mid-1990s, the central government put an end to the
policy of free higher education as well as guaranteed em-
ployment for university students. All students had henceforth
to pay for higher education and to compete for jobs in the
emerging market economy. But this policy has had a crip-
pling effect on the lower classes i.e. peasants and workers,
especially the poor. They lack the ability to support their
sons and daughters through many years of tertiary educa-
tion. And they lack the social networks necessary to help
their sons and daughters vie for occupations alongside well-
connected urban folk after graduation. In recent years, there
have been reports in the Chinese media of some students
from poor families having given up their chance of higher ed-
ucation after obtaining the coveted documents granting
places in universities and colleges. This is because more and
more undergraduates from among the lower classes feel un-
able to compete for jobs in the absence of the right connec-
tions. A survey in 2003 showed more than 120 undergradu-
ates remained unemployed in Huining county in northwest-
ern China’s Gansu province.((7) Most of their parents were
peasants and had incurred heavy debts in order to support
their children’s education. And the inability to compete and
land jobs meant they were unable to earn and pay off the
debts their parents had accumulated. The survey showed in-
creasing unemployment among undergraduates in rural
areas.
Another source of continuing inequality is the retention by
the central government of the right to dictate how the quota
of university places is distributed among different regions of
China. It is done according to the administrative ranking of
the regions, not according to the proportion of the regional
population in the nation’s total. This is a recipe for unequal
distribution. Thus, Beijing University and Tsinghua Univer-
sity reserve more places for Beijing residents every year than
for all the rural areas. Although the central government has
allowed increases of the total number of university students
as a whole since the mid-1990s and sought to provide more
opportunities in higher education, the imbalance in the dis-
tribution of regional quotas has not been changed.
Thus, unequal distribution of resources has heightened the
inequality in educational opportunities available in different
regions of China. On the one hand, inequality as between
rural and the urban areas is the biggest, followed by that be-
tween advanced regions and those lagging behind, as well as
the disparity that sets different levels of administrative juris-
dictions apart. On the other hand, policies with regard to
making available educational opportunities are weighted
against the poor.Group Interest s  at  Work
Why are such policies being pursued in a country that has
long sworn by social justice, which ought to mean everyone
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Education and Social Inequality in China
is assured equal access to educational opportunities, regard-
less of class, ethnic origin, region, gender or age? One pos-
sible answer is that the educational policies are related to
the dynamics of group interests. In the structure of group in-
terests, those who make policies derive most benefits from
them, and those outside the groups are denied any share of
power or the opportunity to bargain with the policy-makers.
Education is an important resource that can be parlayed for
power, money and a good occupation. In sociological theo-
ries, education is seen as an important achieved mechanism
for realising upward social mobility. But as the above analy-
sis shows, individual effort can run up against the unequal
distribution of educational resources. Therefore, education
by itself cannot be a tool to achieve social justice, because
social class interests influence the allocation of resources. In
other words, the upper classes or elite groups try to make
use of education in order to maintain their class superiority
into the next generation.((8)
As one way of achieving a high social status is through high
quality education during childhood and youth, which could
open the door to good employment, the elite groups can be
expected to make use of education policies in order to safe-
guard their offspring’s interests. They have several advan-
tages that ensure success in this venture. Firstly, almost all
the policy-makers live in urban areas, especially in cities, and
consider modernising urban education as the priority. Gen-
erally speaking, they pour more funds into educational infra-
structure in urban areas and reserve more places in institu-
tions of higher learning for city-dwellers. Thanks to superior
resources, urban students usually fare better compared to
their country cousins and garner more opportunities even in
a theoretically level playing field. For example, among rural
residents the ratio of those going on from middle school to
high school ranged from 22.3% to 18.6% between 1985 and
1999, whereas in urban areas, between 40% and 55.4%
graduated from middle to high schools during the same pe-
riod. As for higher education, urban residents have 5.8
times greater access compared to the rural people. More
than 80% of the rural people have no access to higher edu-
cation.((9) In Beijing and Shanghai, where most of the high-
est policy-makers live and cluster, the educational infrastruc-
ture has received the highest support and funding. Many of
the best schools and universities are located in these cities.
Within urban areas, the division between the best schools—
i.e. those that prepare students to enter prestigious institu-
tions of higher learning—and general schools is another fac-
tor entrenching group differences. The best schools are de-
pended on to help raise more elites for China. The country’s
leadership is counting on these elites to manage its affairs in
the decades ahead. In Chinese cities, both big and small,
most of the students in the best schools are those from the
upper classes. For example, in Beijing, 57.3% of students in
the best high schools are from the upper classes, although
they account for just 10% of total population of Beijing.((10)
In Maanshan city in eastern China’s Anhui province, 67.1%
of the students in the best high schools are from upper class
families.((11) In Beijing, one of the best middle schools has
been supported by 170 million yuan from the city govern-
ment in the past seven years.((12) But the lavish financial sup-
port for that one middle school equals the total annual out-
lay of a general county in central China. The School’s im-
pressive campus boasts a striking architecture and the latest
facilities. Interviews conducted by this author elicited the in-
formation that two of the highest leaders of China graduated
from this school.((13) Children of Beijing’s richest families,
high-ranking leaders and top professionals account for more
than 50% of the students at that school. Such elite schools
command good funding and are able to attract the best
teachers, ensuring a superior performance by their students
in the annual national university examinations.
The city government feels obliged to support the best
schools, because many officials’ children stand to benefit.
Moreover, such a practice gets enthusiastic welcome among
top professionals whose social networks form seamless links
with those of the leading officials and other wealthy families.
Over the past ten years, some Chinese scholars have argued
against dividing schools into those for the elite and the gen-
eral stream. Their view has popular backing but has found
little favour with the decision-makers. After all, the best
schools serve a useful purpose in safeguarding the elites’ su-
periority in inter-generation mobility.Migrants’  Woes
As for those left out of the best schools, not only are they
less able to compete with the elite children at a later stage,
many of them suffer blatant discrimination. One group that
has long been at a disadvantage is made up of migrant work-
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ers’ children. Migrant workers find many obstacles in the
way of educating their children, including blocked access to
public (government-run) schools in cities. The central gov-
ernment issued an important document decreeing that au-
thorities at all levels should give equal education rights to mi-
grant workers’ children living with their parents as from
2004.((14) But this advice has yet to be fully complied with.
About 20 million migrant children are estimated to be living
with their migrant parents, the total number of migrants in
China being 150 million.((15) Migrant children’s access to
public schools has been improving since 2004. According to
an official report, 63% of migrant children have gained ad-
mission to public schools in Beijing.((16)
In fact, however, it is difficult to calculate how many migrant
children live with their parents in Beijing and other cities. A
survey conducted by this author in 2007 showed that mi-
grant children outnumber figures cited in the official data be-
cause not all of them are necessarily registered with the se-
curity departments in cities. Further, the proportion of the
migrant children who go to public or government-run schools
is less than that estimated by the authorities.
Those migrant children who are barred from the best
schools are not free of discrimination elsewhere: In many
places they find themselves lumped together into separate
class sections and not permitted to study with urban children
in the same classrooms. Urban parents do not wish to have
their children associating with migrant children and the
teachers oblige, in the belief that the urban children’s per-
formances would be affected through such association. So-
cial exclusion affects the migrant children’s self-respect. The
experience of Liu Yi,((17) who moved to Beijing in 2001 with
her parents, is a case in point. She had been studying at a
school for migrant children in Beijing’s Shijingshan until
2005 when her parents secured her admission in a public
school in Xicheng district. On the very second day, she was
accused of stealing a pencil box by an urban classmate and
the teacher accepted the accusation with little consideration.
This angered Liu Yi, who was unwilling to continue study-
ing in that school and demanded that her parents send her
to a migrant children’s school. She said she “hated” urban
people as they were unfriendly towards migrants in Beijing.
She also said that in the schools for migrant children, all the
students were from the rural areas and thus felt equal to each
other.
Discrimination against migrant children is a major obstacle
to integration into urban society. Moreover, schools for mi-
grants have flexible timings that suit the workers who have
to keep long and irregular hours. Another reason for prefer-
ring migrants’ schools is that they cost less compared to
other urban institutions.
Sometimes migrant children face discriminatory acts of a dra-
conian nature, affecting their right to education. In August
2006, the Haidian district government in Beijing closed
down 39 schools for migrant children on the grounds that
they lacked legal registration. As a result, about 15,000 mi-
grant children found themselves out of school. While the
Haidian government said public schools would admit those
children, their parents found that in fact none were willing to
do so. They had to put their children in schools located in
other districts. Some migrant parents said they felt cheated
by the Haidian government. However district officials said all
the migrant children had been admitted in government-run
schools and that none had been refused a school place.((18)
The ban on migrant children’s schools was in fact intended to
reduce the number of migrants in Haidian district, where in-
cidentally, some of China’s top universities and other institu-
tions are located. According to Zhao’s survey, schooling is
one of the three most difficult issues facing migrant people in
Beijing, the other two being the high cost of living and poor
access to healthcare.((19)
Migrants in many other cities in China, including Shanghai
and Guangzhou, have witnessed similar problems. It is esti-
mated that across China, two thirds of migrant children are
not permitted to attend public schools in cities.((20) Govern-
ments at different levels in China are, in effect, failing to pro-
tect the right of children to education. Most of the children
take recourse to schools opened by migrant people. These
lack trained teachers or good quality facilities that ought to
have been accorded to them by virtue of laws covering edu-
cation. In fact, the very lack of good facilities and teachers
in such schools is held against them and they get banned, as
happened in Beijing’s Haidian district in 2006. Like in
Haidian, authorities in many other places have sought to
force migrant people to move elsewhere by banning schools
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catering to their children. Most local governments ignore
their responsibility to guarantee equal education for migrant
children, believing any such concessions would harm the
quality of education in their jurisdictions. In one of the ad-
vanced south-eastern provinces, some high officials from the
education administrative department said in interviews that
it was not their responsibility to take on the task that ought
to be fulfilled by some other province the migrants hail
from.((21) This is tantamount to denial of the right to educa-
tion of the migrant children in the cities where they live with
their parents.
So far no institutional mechanism has emerged in China to
promote, fulfil and protect the equal rights of all children to
education and to empower them to claim and safeguard that
right. According to the education laws and orders issued by
the central government in 2004, migrant children’s educa-
tion rights should be guaranteed by the local governments in
receiving areas. But in fact, the rights are ignored by the
local officials. Such a violation of the right to education has
never been punished. Rather it has been encouraged and
supported by members of the upper classes, who prefer to
keep their children away from the company of migrants. The
interests of upper classes have not been challenged nor
threatened by other classes, because the latter are weak.
They are unable to influence the policies that affect their
children’s education and are prevented from protesting in
public. So they can only use the “weapons of the weak” to
express their discontent: Some migrants silently leave for
cities where their children face less of a rejection or leave
them with the grandparents in the home province. In some
extreme instances farmers killed themselves because they
could not raise the money to send their sons or daughters to
universities in recent years.((22) The media sometimes tries to
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help them out by filing reports that make society take notice
and bring some pressure to bear on the authorities, espe-
cially of the central government. Nevertheless, until now, no
forthright measure or policy has been adopted to weaken the
relationship between education and the interests of the
upper classes.Educat ion and Social  Harmony
The highest leaders of the Communist Party and the state
have taken cognisance of the state of education in rural
China and the imbalance in the distribution of resources,
which can adversely affect national modernisation and re-
sult in social conflict. To be sure, they have devised some
educational policies to address these concerns. They
pledged to provide free compulsory education for all rural
people within three years from 2005 and to invest more to
help rural children’s access to higher education. In 2004,
the central government demanded that local governments
extend compulsory education to migrant children. Educa-
tion is free for all rural people starting from 2007. And uni-
versity students from poor families have been promised fi-
nancial support. All these measures have tinkered with the
problems to some extent.((23)
But the basic infrastructure behind the uneven distribution
of resources has not been overhauled. The central govern-
ment may demand that schools cease charging for compul-
sory education in rural areas but the reality is that many
schools simply cannot function without raising money to
meet expenses that are not met by the local administration
or governments at higher levels. Financial support for rural
schools is supposed to come from county and township ad-
ministrations but they lack the money for their own ex-
penses, let alone having to fork out funds for educating
children in far off villages. Surveys conducted by this au-
thor in 2007 showed some rural schools went to great
lengths to meet the demands of daily expenditure and in
many cases it was the peasants who were left holding the
bill.
Meanwhile, the Hukou, or household registration system
and other related institutionalised forms of exclusion have
changed little, keeping migrant people out in the cold. They
are far from getting equal citizenship alongside urban resi-
dents and their integration into urban societies is still far off.
The central authorities’ desire to construct a harmonious so-
ciety comes up against many such obstacles but the preser-
vation of group interests as seen in their failure to tackle dis-
crimination in the educational arena root and branch, is the
biggest as it continues discrimination in succeeding genera-
tions.Conclusion
Over the past three decades, educational policies and distri-
bution of resources have been transformed. But the main
trend of the changes has not been positive and has only ex-
acerbated inequalities between different classes or groups
and regions in China. The networks based on social classes
have played a major role in the distribution of resources and
opportunities. Powerful officials, urban intellectuals and pro-
fessionals as well as other people with wealth have used
their influence to change the distribution of educational op-
portunities in a way that benefits their own interests. So the
social structure and educational policies have only gone
about expanding social inequality in China.
Educational inequality is among the three principal inequal-
ities in China, the other two being inequality in the power
equations and inequality of incomes. Compared with other
types of inequalities, education may give the impression of
being rational and legal. It would appear to people that ed-
ucation places great emphasis on performance and achieve-
ment, through impartial indicators such as examinations. But
few care to reflect on the irrationality and injustice that lies
behind education in the form of institutionalised discrimina-
tion that puts tens of millions of children at a disadvantage.
In fact, many people in rural China have despaired of bene-
fiting from education and have turned their backs on
schools. The idea that “going to schools is useless” is gain-
ing ground and is likely to pose a big challenge to China’s
modernisation plans.
Thus, although educational equality is important for the con-
struction of a harmonious society that is sought by the cur-
rent Chinese leadership, the balance of forces between dif-
ferent social groups or classes gives little cause for optimism.
The lower classes are unable to make a dent in the policies
that put them at a great disadvantage. They lack the power
to influence decision-makers and to persuade them to adopt
rational and equitable educational policies. The key to
achieving a harmonious society would thus be to empower
the people at large so that they can one day have a say in
making decisions on education. •
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